

PART II -- MAIN EDITION -- 7 JANUARY 1983

WALL STREET JOURNAL 7 JANUARY 1983 Pg. 16

Strategies of Soviet Warfare

OMG man at DIA

By JOHN G. HINES
And PHILLIP A. PETERSEN

The chief of the Soviet general staff believes that major advances in military hardware are dictating changes in the way wars will be fought. In his book "Always in Readiness to Defend the Fatherland," published early in 1982, Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov declared that "a profound, and in the full sense revolutionary turn in military affairs is taking place. . . ." He noted that this technological revolution permits, indeed requires, development of fighting concepts that fully exploit the more advanced weapons systems. True to the Marxist-Leninist concept of change, the marshal described the final phase of this "dialectic" process as the modification of the armed forces' organization, command and weapons mix.

The single most significant effect of this "revolution" appears to be increased confidence of the Soviets in their ability to fight protracted operations using conventional weapons only. Such a "protracted" conventional offensive would certainly last more than several days but, in Central Europe, would probably require that the most important objectives be achieved before NATO could introduce major U.S. reinforcements.

Recent statements by Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov clearly suggest increased Soviet emphasis on conventional warfare capability. In a July 12, 1982 article in Pravda, the defense chief reiterated Brezhnev's June 1982 unilateral renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons. "This means," he said, "that now in the preparation of the armed forces even more attention will be devoted to tasks of preventing the development of a military conflict into a nuclear one. . . ." If the Soviets really intend to avoid first use of nuclear weapons and at the same time prepare to "prevent" the enemy from going nuclear, they must intend to accomplish this with conventional weapons.

The Soviet military's growing respect for the capabilities of space-age conventional weapons has become more evident in recent years. In an April 1980 issue of the military newspaper Red Star, a general officer described as a military scientist and engineer acknowledged that even foreign military observers note how ". . . conventional weapons are becoming more and more, in a manner of speaking, unconventional, approaching in many of their combat characteristics weapons of mass destruction [a Soviet term for nuclear and chemical weapons]."

Improvement in Arms

At the same time, it is evident from the U.S. Department of Defense booklet "Soviet Military Power," published in the fall of 1981, that many of the recent improvements in Soviet arms represent a quantitative and qualitative enhancement of conventional weaponry, especially in the air, artillery and rocket fire support systems

that would substitute for tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional war.

The deputy chief of the general staff academy in Moscow explicitly acknowledged the greater need for conventional fire support during a non-nuclear offensive in a December 1981 article in the Soviet Military Historical Journal. "Under present-day conditions," he wrote, "when conducting an offensive using conventional weapons, achievement of a penetration [of enemy lines] can . . . require concentration of large masses of artillery, aviation and tanks and provision of reliable suppression of the numerous antitank weapons of the enemy. . . . To increase the tempo of the offensive . . . it will be essential to make missile and air strikes over the entire depth of his [the enemy's] defenses and to make wide use of airborne assaults."

It is clear that Soviet military planners are developing air and ground operations that would improve their chances in a conventional war. As Polish military scientists have recently acknowledged, air and air defense operations by masses of aircraft in conjunction with deep "raid" and maneuver activity by large tank-heavy units (now referred to as "operational maneuver groups") will be essential for rapid success in a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact. Obviously, the success of even the most aggressive air and ground conventional attack would be seriously disrupted by widespread strikes from NATO tactical nuclear weapons. Hence, as one Polish military scientist stated explicitly, ". . . the success of an offensive operation will depend . . . above all, on the elimination of nuclear missiles during the conventional phase of the battle."

Through early destruction or seizure of objectives deep in NATO territory, and the

The Soviets are not perfecting their ability to conduct protracted conventional war instead of nuclear war. They are enhancing their ability to do both.

rapid fragmentation of NATO's forward defense on a broad front, the Soviets might hope to quickly reduce the perceived utility of continued resistance. If the Soviets could sufficiently degrade NATO's tactical nuclear capability during an initial non-nuclear phase, and thus quickly create the impression of the inevitability of defeat, NATO would be faced with Soviet theater nuclear forces that were clearly superior, and its use of remaining nuclear assets might appear futile.

Those who might doubt that the Soviets would seriously contemplate—much less plan for—a protracted conventional offen-

sive should consider three factors. The most obvious is geography. The Soviets quite understandably view nuclear war in the European theater from a European perspective. The most economically developed and urbanized sector of the U.S.S.R. is in Europe. Hence the Soviets contemplate the prospect of a nuclear exchange in Europe with about the same detachment as an American contemplating a theater nuclear war in southern Canada.

Second, if nuclear weapons were removed from the military equation in Europe, the Soviets would clearly have the advantage in any short war. The exchange of even tactical nuclear weapons would introduce a high degree of uncertainty about the outcome of any theater conflict, and would entail considerable risk of transition to a global nuclear exchange in which major portions of the Soviet homeland would be destroyed—consequences the Soviets understandably prefer to avoid.

Third, the destruction of West European industry in a nuclear conflict could significantly reduce Soviet opportunities to offset the costs of the war through exploitation of captured territories.

On the other hand, those who believe that the Soviets' growing interest in conventional warfare represents a mellowing on their part seriously misunderstand the rationale behind recent Soviet military developments. The Soviets are not perfecting their capability to conduct protracted conventional war *instead of* or at the expense of developing their ability to fight a nuclear war; they are striving to enhance their ability to do *both*. A July 1982 article in the Soviet journal Military Herald strongly suggests that the Soviets are planning use of subkiloton nuclear warheads in their numerous smaller-caliber artillery tubes—certainly not evidence of a rejection of the possibility of nuclear war. In effect, the Soviets are greatly improving their conventional capability in terms of operations, organization and hardware, while ruling out nothing in the way of further development in nuclear capability. The threat to NATO is expanding at the conventional end of the scale, but it is not contracting at the nuclear end.

Is NATO Prepared?

Recent Soviet military developments mean that the Soviets are rapidly improving their capability to fight the kind of war for which NATO is *least* prepared. As NATO's supreme commander, Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, recently noted, "We have mortgaged the defense of NATO to a nuclear response because nations have not been prepared to pay the cost of a credible conventional force." NATO is relying on nuclear weapons for defense as well as for deterrence, while their deterrent value becomes less and less credible in light of global and theater nuclear parity (some would say Soviet superiority).

STRATEGIES . . . 10-F

PART II -- MAIN EDITION -- 7 JANUARY 1983

NATIONAL JOURNAL 8 JANUARY 1983 (7) PAGES 58-59

The Air Force's New B-1B Strategic Bomber Program**... It Could Cost \$20.5 Billion or It Could Cost \$27 Billion**

To President Reagan, the Air Force's new B-1B strategic bomber represents the fulfillment of a campaign promise. To Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, it is a visible addition to the U.S. strategic deterrent. But to some present and former Pentagon officials, the B-1B stands as a prominent exception to the Pentagon's assertion that it can now predict weapons costs more accurately. "They haven't faced up to some of the big ones," said Jacques S. Gansler, a former deputy assistant Defense secretary for materiel acquisition and author of *The Defense Industry* (MIT Press, 1980).

To the critics, the problem is not just with the numbers but with the way the estimates were made. As Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., brought out, the Pentagon's working estimate for the B-1B is substantially lower than the one arrived at in an independent Air Force cost analysis and by the Pentagon's cost analysis improvement group.

The over-all difference between the various estimates is no small matter. The estimate presented by the B-1B program manager and blessed by Weinberger pegs the cost of 100 planes at \$20.5 billion in fiscal 1981 dollars. The independent Air Force estimate added about \$2 billion to this projection. The cost improvement group, which has a better track record than the services in projecting weapons costs, put the ultimate cost of the B-1B program in the \$26 billion to \$27 billion range.


Much of the difference re-

flects a disagreement about what should be included in the estimate. For example, the B-1B program, unlike some other major aircraft programs, such as the F-15, F-16 and A-10, does not include the cost of training simulators. The independent Air Force estimate and the cost improvement group had recommended that some \$300 million in fiscal 1981 dollars be added to the program to take care of the cost of such simulators.

Levin criticized this omission as a deviation from "established, prudent management and budgeting procedures" that would "artificially reduce" the projected price of the B-1B. The Air Force program manager contends that this change is the start of a policy of ensuring that simulator and training funds are not given short shrift by weapons program managers. If the Air Force included the simulators and other "appropriate additions" to the B-1B program, the total cost of the program would rise by some \$1.433 billion.

But even setting this difference aside, the cost improvement group says that the program manager's estimate may be about 25 per cent too low. A sizable chunk reflects a dispute over projected "savings" from multiyear procurement. The program manager assumed that some \$800 million would be saved by efficiencies of scale to be achieved by a yet-to-be negotiated multiyear contract for buying 92 planes from 1984 through 1986. But the cost improvement group

(CONTINUED BELOW)



The B-1B bomber: a costly campaign promise

and the General Accounting Office (GAO) advised against counting on this saving and stated that the data were too "soft" to make a firm projection of how much could be saved.

In particular, the GAO charged that the B-1B might not be a suitable candidate for multiyear procurement because such a contract would have to be made three years before research and development on the plane is complete. The Air Force replied that multiyear procurement is warranted because efforts have been made to hold changes in the plane's configuration to a bare minimum and much research and development has already been done.

According to Major Gen. Robert D. Russ, director of operational requirements in the Air Force's research and development office, another "major difference" stemmed from different projections about the "learning curve"—the assumption that the unit cost of labor and materials declines as the cumulative number of planes increases. The program manager projects that the unit costs of the B-1B will drop significantly over a five-year period.

The table shows B-1B costs in constant 1982 dollars and is based on figures submitted to Congress in the Pentagon's selected acquisitions report last September. The figures include production start-up costs, training costs and the cost of spare parts but exclude research and development charges.

	Planes produced	Cost (billions)
1982	1	\$1.3
1983	7	3.0
1984	10	4.3
1985	36	5.0
1986	46	4.4

The figures suggest that the cost of the first 18 B-1Bs will almost equal the projected cost of the remaining 82 planes. Some cost experts point out that this comparison is somewhat

distorted by the inclusion of spare parts and production costs, which occur mostly in the early part of the program.

But there is no question that the learning curve assumed by the program manager is more optimistic than that produced in the independent Air Force estimate and by the cost improvement group. GAO evaluator Robert Murphy told the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense that the "primary differences" between a \$9.8 billion estimate of the B-1 airframe produced by the plane's program manager and the \$11.2 billion figure arrived at by the independent Air Force group and the cost improvement group "are the learning curves that they would expect to see as the aircraft are built."

The program manager and the cost improvement group also disagreed about the learning curves involved in the production of the planes' avionics.

Murphy testified that it was too early to render an ultimate judgment on the accuracy of the learning curve used for the B-1B program. But he said one early indication is evident in the Air Force's negotiations over a second lot of seven B-1 airframes. "We see a difference of about 17 per cent in what they were able to negotiate versus what they had built into their estimate for the man-hours involved in building the seven aircraft," he said.

Russ, in congressional testimony, responded that the Air Force's learning curve for worker hours identified in its planning document merely laid out a "going-in" position for negotiations with the B-1B contractor, Rockwell International Corp. The Air Force's actual estimate, he said, was only about 3.6 per cent too low, and lower-than-expected wage rates negotiated by the Air Force more than made up the difference.

But Russ's arguments apparently haven't moved the GAO. Murray said in an interview that his office has reviewed Russ's claims and "we stand by our original analysis."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 7 JANUARY 1983 Pg. 22

Richard L. Strout

Where US defense is weak

Washington

America is absent-minded about its own ethnicity. I think it is about the only country that is this way. When my grandfather sat in the New Hampshire legislature after the Civil War it was just taken for granted that the American racial stock would continue to be predominantly Anglo-Saxon. The tide of variegated immigrants was only starting to rise. Now the population pattern has changed drastically. Other great rivers have flowed into the central pool. Even to raise the ethnic issue is often regarded as racist.

I know of no other country where conditions are parallel to this in scale and consequence. The United States will defend its borders, of course. President Reagan will ask Congress this year for a military budget of \$245 billion or so. That protects the United States militarily. But to protect the physical borders the government assigns only about \$77 million for its border patrol. This is grossly inadequate. There are only about 350 patrolmen on duty at any one time. I do not believe that there is another such example in the world. Take the 2,000-mile Mexican border, for example. It is porous. Nobody knows for sure, of course, but estimates are that the number of illegal Mexican aliens in the United States about equals the 12 million US workers unemployed.

Former Immigration Commissioner Leonard Chapman estimated in July 1976 that only one of every three or four persons attempting

to enter illegally was apprehended.

The casualness of this is what startles the foreigner. Nearly everybody agrees that the situation needs tightening. A high-level presidential commission studied the matter. It produced the compromise Immigration Reform and Control Act (Simpson/Mazzoli) in 1982. This proposed sanctions on employers who knowingly hired illegal aliens, and methods of identification. The Senate passed the measure overwhelmingly, 80 to 19. Did it pass the House? Not at all. It never got a vote. Now the work starts over again. On any dark night on the Mexican border bands of illegals enter. As broadcaster David Brinkley said on his show Nov. 14, "Illegal immigration is now almost totally out of control." There is wide agreement.

This situation, of course, affects America's economy. It involves job supply, workers' wages, and the simple question of whether the nation can enforce its own policies. The attraction of employment here is a magnet that brings illegal entry from around the world. A federal law forbidding employers to hire aliens lacking work authorization cards would dull or remove the magnet. The proposed bill has compassionate provisions recognizing the plight of those illegal aliens who have lived here a long time. But now we are back at space one, the starting point.

The United States has brought its own population almost under control; natural increase is about 0.8 percent a year. Mexico's

natural increase is three times that, around 2.5 percent a year, one of the highest in the world. Mexico is almost broke. The surge to come to the United States, legally or illegally, has rarely been higher. It is true of many other hard-up countries, too. Confronted by this global situation the United States can't make up its mind to take the stern steps of restraint to preserve its relatively advantageous position. We waver.

On Dec. 8 the Mexican Senate (according to Federation for American Immigration Reform, the local interest group which watches such things) unanimously passed a resolution questioning the US policy of controlling immigration and expressing "our alarm and concern for the repercussions which will impact both countries if the Simpson/Mazzoli legislation is passed." The Mexican statement continued that "this transcendent matter should not be considered from a unilateral perspective, but rather should be treated from a bilateral and even multilateral perspective, taking into account the far-reaching migratory phenomenon of undocumented persons between our two countries." The Mexican Senate referred proposed stricter US immigration policies to the Latin American Congress, the World Congress, the Group of Parliamentarians for a New World Order, and to its own Foreign Relations Committee.

Hi-ho. The Mexican Senate says it's not our business; the US Congress says nothing and US unemployment hits 10.8 percent.

STRATEGIES...Continued

Judging by the Soviets' own concept of deterrence, *sderzhivaniye*, which roughly translates as "holding" or "restraining," the Soviets are more likely to be "deterred" by a perception that NATO can "hold" them at every level of conflict. Reliance on an essentially all-or-nothing threat of nuclear retaliation tends to invite the very strategy the Soviets have apparently been refining—a strategy that envisions early and, if possible, preemptive destruction of most of NATO's in-theater nuclear arsenal with conventional weapons, accompanied by a high-speed offensive that would exploit Soviet superiority in conventional forces. The speed of such an offensive might render a NATO response with global nuclear systems pointless. Common sense would argue that ICBMs and submarine-launched missiles are inappropriate for strikes against battlefield targets, especially when the battlefield is Western Europe, and strikes against the Soviet Union would lead to retaliation against the U.S. while not necessarily

changing the outcome of the war in Europe.

In light of changes resulting from this most recent stage in the development of Soviet military thought and of the Soviet armed forces, we in the West might consider the warning issued by Marshal Ogarkov in his book to his own forces: "Under these conditions belated updating of views and stagnation in the development and implementation of new matters pertaining to military force development are fraught with serious consequences."

Maj. Hines and Mr. Petersen are Soviet analysts at the Defense Intelligence Agency. This article was adapted from a paper presented in October at the National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE Pg. 4

7 JANUARY 1983

Naval personnel's voting criticized

NORFOLK, Va.—Navy men and women have an atrocious voting record and should make their views known at the polls if they are concerned about pay and benefits, says the Navy's top enlisted man, Master Chief Billy C. Sanders. He estimated that no more than 20 percent of the Navy's 540,000 members vote in elections. In contrast, 53.9 percent of voting-age adults cast ballots in the 1980 presidential election. Sanders said he was emphasizing voting because there have been "some big cuts in Navy military personnel money."

PEACE...Continued

ate American Jews and other supporters of Israel.

Could the impasse in Lebanon scuttle Reagan's drive for an overall peace?

Certainly. His credibility is at stake. If Reagan cannot convince the Israelis to leave Lebanon, he will have a hard time persuading the Arab world that he can get Israel to accept the key elements of his settlement plan. These include Israel's giving up the West Bank of the Jordan River and agreeing to creation of a Palestinian entity linked to Jordan in return for a peace agreement with the Arabs.

Reagan must show progress in Lebanon or his initiative may be doomed. Jordan's King Hussein underscored that view when he visited the President in the White House in late December.

Is the Lebanese Army capable of taking over if and when foreign forces leave?

Not now. The Army totals only about 22,000 men—demoralized, badly equipped and ill-trained. It has been kicked around since it disintegrated during the 1975-76 civil war and at present is no match for the numerous militia forces in the country. Because officers are mainly Christian and lower ranks mainly Moslem, it is difficult for the Army to curb sectarian strife. One analyst's assessment: "The Army lacks the manpower, matériel and respect needed to impose its will throughout the country."

What is the U.S. doing to help Lebanon strengthen its armed forces?

President Amin Gemayel recently gave Washington a shopping list that included armored personnel carriers, small arms and other hardware—some of which is in the pipeline. Gemayel seeks credits for military purchases and wants American advisers to teach his soldiers how to use the equipment. U.S. marines with the multinational peacekeeping force around Beirut have initiated some small training projects.

Why is Gemayel having trouble establishing his authority?

With most of Lebanon under occupation, Gemayel's influence is limited largely to Beirut. Even in the capital, the Christian Phalangists who backed his election and provide his political base remain largely loyal to Gemayel's brother Bashir, who was assassinated shortly before he was to be inaugurated as President. They tend to go their own way and have the guns to back their will. As a Maronite Christian in a land where religious and family ties run deep, Gemayel is having trouble

selling his policy of national reconciliation to the Moslems, who make up more than half the population.

What are the major Lebanese factions?

Apart from the Israelis, the Syrians and PLO forces in the Syrian sector, they include the Christian Phalangists and the secretive Moslem Druze forces. Violence also breaks out often between Sunni and Shiite Moslems as well as among leftists of various hues.

Are PLO fighters returning to Lebanon? Increasingly. After their dispersal

resembles Beirut of a year ago—a city of gunmen, militia checkpoints, murders, bombings and kidnappings.

Are Lebanese living under Israeli occupation flourishing or resentful?

Both, to an extent. Lebanese accept the Israeli presence because it enables them to rebuild profitable businesses and to trade in comparative peace. But they complain that the Israelis are staying too long. They dislike military occupation and fear that trade links with Arab states will be harmed if the Israelis remain much longer.

Is the 4,300-member multinational peacekeeping force making headway in helping Lebanon rebuild?

So far, the role of the force—1,200 U.S. marines, 1,500 French troops and 1,600 Italians—is limited. Deployed around Beirut, its main task is to assure the safety of the civilian population while the city tries to get back on its feet. The three contingents are cleaning up explosives scattered throughout the city, and the marines have helped get the international airport back in operation.

Will the force be expanded?

Gemayel wants an international army of 30,000 men to stay after Israeli-Syrian-PLO troops pull out. Reagan is said to be sympathetic to a doubling of the American contingent. Britain is sending a small force of 80 men; and other nations also are being asked to provide troops. Still, it is unlikely Gemayel will get the numbers he wants. Whatever its size, however, multinational troops must stay here until the Lebanese Army becomes strong enough to do the job itself. And that could be a long time.

With so many difficulties ahead, is there a danger of renewed fighting?

The longer foreign troops remain, the greater the risks. Israel is alarmed by Syrian troop reinforcements and the expansion of PLO forces in Lebanon. An even greater danger is that the PLO and the Syrians may try to revenge the defeat they suffered last summer. If diplomacy fails to score a breakthrough by spring, there could be an explosion.

Could U.S. marines become involved?

That danger is always present. Senior officers fear that some individual might believe he can become a hero by killing a marine. "There are a lot of crazies out there," notes one expert. Contact between marines and the Lebanese is restricted, but there always is a chance that the Americans could be caught up in renewed warfare. □

By AL WEBB

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR 7 January 1983
Pg. 2

Soviets deny satellite fall to Earth poses danger

Washington

The Pentagon says the nuclear-powered Cosmos 1402 Soviet spy satellite will come crashing back to Earth this month, but a Russian space expert says it does not pose "a dangerous situation."

The vice-president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences said in Moscow that changes in the satellite's orbit were part of a "preplanned operation" and that he has "no fears about the fate of this sputnik."

Prof. Heinz Kaminski, director of West Germany's Bochum Space Research Center, suggested that only the US space shuttle could rescue the satellite and prevent it from falling to Earth.

from Beirut to other Arab countries last September, several hundred already have made their way back to the Bekaa Valley and Tripoli by way of Syria. With about 9,000 Palestinians nominally under the Syrian Army, they worry the Israelis, who see another PLO threat looming "over the next hill."

How do average Lebanese react to their protracted life under the gun?

With the PLO gone and Moslem militia disarmed, Beirut seems relatively calm despite occasional bombings and shootings. Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon is recovering. But elsewhere, life is hectic and dangerous.

Religious, political and family feuds continue in the hills, particularly between Christian militia and the Moslem Druze sect. Mountain roads are unsafe. The northern port of Tripoli